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A4. Interpretation
EU LEGISLATION​
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Consider wording, context and objective
"[33] In accordance with settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgment of 28 October 2021, Magistrat der Stadt Wien (Grand Hamster – II), C‑357/20, EU:C:2021:881, paragraph 20)." (I GmbH C-228/20)
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Interpret consistently with the treaty and general principles
"[32] However, it is settled case‑law that a provision of secondary Community law should as far as possible be given the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty and the general principles of EU law (Case C‑314/89 Rauh [1991] ECR I‑1647, paragraph 17, and Case C‑413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala [2008] ECR I‑4951, paragraph 174 and the case‑law cited)." (Orfey Balgaria EOOD C-549/11)
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Other language versions to be considered in case of doubt
"[26] In addition, it follows from settled case-law that the need for a uniform interpretation of Community directives makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation; on the contrary, it requires that it be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages (Case C-296/95 EMUTabac and Others [1998] ECR I‑1605, paragraph 36, and Case C‑321/96 Mecklenburg [1998] ECR I-3809, paragraph 29).
[27] In those circumstances, the reply to the first question must be that the word ‘charitable’ in the English version of Article 13A(1)(g) and (h) of the Sixth Directive has its own independent meaning in Community law which must be interpreted taking account of all the language versions of that directive
(Kingcrest Associates Ltd C-498/03)
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- Wording of one language version cannot serve as the sole basis for overriding others
"[46] In accordance with settled case-law, provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union (judgment of 26 July 2017, Mengesteab, C‑670/16, EU:C:2017:587, paragraph 82 and the case-law cited).
[47] It is also settled case-law that the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision or be made to override the other language versions (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 October 2021, KAHL and Roeper, C‑197/20 and C‑216/20, EU:C:2021:892, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited)." (I GmbH C-228/20)
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- Resolve differences based on purpose and general scheme
"[44]... Where there is divergence between the various language versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see Case C‑372/88 Cricket St Thomas [1990] ECR I‑1345, paragraphs 18 and 19; Case C‑149/97 Institute of the Motor Industry [1998] ECR I‑7053, paragraph 16; and Case C‑451/08 Helmut Müller [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 38)." (Commission v. Netherlands C-41/09)
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External aides to interpretation​
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- Declarations in the course of preparatory works not an aide where no reference in legislation
"[43] In the second place, as regards the issue, also raised by the referring court and by the German Government, whether an exemption such as the one in Paragraph 4(13) of the UStG has its basis in report No 7 of the meeting of the Council of the European Union of 17 May 1977 concerning Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1, ‘the Sixth Directive’), it should be recalled that, according to that report, ‘the Council and the [European] Commission declare that Member States may exempt making the common property available for use, maintenance, repair and other management purposes, as well as the supply of heat and similar goods by associations of residential property owners to the property owners themselves’.
[44] However, it is settled case-law that declarations made in the course of preparatory work leading to the adoption of a directive cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting that directive where no reference is made to the content of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question, and, moreover, such declarations have no legal significance (see, inter alia, judgment of 22 October 2009, Swiss Re Germany Holding, C‑242/08, EU:C:2009:647, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited)." (WEG C-449/19)
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- Wording of the Sixth Directive
"[47] However, according to the third recital in the preamble to Directive 2006/112, the recasting of the structure and wording of the Sixth Directive aims to ensure that the provisions are presented in a clear and rational manner, which will not, in principle, bring about material changes in the existing legislation, even if a small number of substantive amendments have, in any event, to be made in so far as that is inherent in such a recasting exercise.
[48] In the absence of any substantive amendment of point 1 of Annex III, the general scheme of that provision should be examined in the light of the wording of point 1 of Annex H to the Sixth Directive, which expresses the intention of the EU legislature when it drew up the list of goods and services which may be subject to a reduced rate of VAT.
[49] In that regard, from a semantic point of view, the use of a semi-colon after the phrase ‘[f]oodstuffs … for human and animal consumption’ clearly indicates that the phrase contained in point 1 of Annex H to the Sixth Directive is made up of three quite distinct parts. It must therefore be concluded that, since the intentions of the EU legislature are unchanged, the phrase contained in point 1 of Annex III is made up of the same three parts." (Commission v. Netherlands C-41/09)
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- Other EU legislation with a different purpose not of assistance
"[62] However, it must be pointed out that the purpose of Regulation No 504/2008 is very different from that of point 1 of Annex III. That regulation takes into account the fact that a horse may be consumed by humans and provides, accordingly, rules which seek to ensure that a horse which enters the human food chain is not unfit for consumption. In that context, in order to improve the administration of veterinary medicinal products, that regulation states that an equine animal is in principle intended for slaughter for human consumption." (Commission v. Netherlands C-41/09)
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Implication of restrictions​
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- Not to imply in restriction expressly set out in related provision
"[37] Furthermore, as the Commission of the European Communities and the United Kingdom correctly argued, when the Community legislature intended to restrict the grant of the exemptions under Article 13A(1) of the Sixth Directive to certain non-profit-making or non-commercial entities, it said so expressly, as is clear from subparagraphs (l), (m) and (q) thereof." ​(Kingcrest Associates Ltd C-498/03)
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Otiose language​
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- More general provision of directive replicating condition already contained in specific provision (but applying more widely)
"[33] ... Consequently, as the Commission also points out, the condition set out in the first indent of Article 13A(2)(a) essentially replicates the criterion of non-profit-making organisation as contained in Article 13A(1)(m).
[34] The Netherlands Government argues that such an interpretation does not take account of the fact that the first indent of Article 13A(2)(a) must, as an additional condition, necessarily have a content extending beyond that of the basic provision. In response to that argument, it suffices to observe that that condition does not refer only to Article 13A(1)(m) of the Sixth Directive but also to a large number of other compulsory exemptions which have a different content." (Kennemer Golf C-174/00)
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Interpretation of exemptions​
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- Strict interpretation
"[19] At paragraph 13 of the same judgment the Court held that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover tax is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person." (Bulthuis-Griffioen C-453/93)
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- Not to deprive exemption of intended effect
"[34]...Accordingly, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effect (judgment of 15 April 2021, Administration de l’Enregistrement, des Domaines et de la TVA, C‑846/19, EU:C:2021:277, paragraph 57)." (I GmbH C-228/20)
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"[25] As is clear from settled case-law, the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 132 of the VAT Directive are to be interpreted strictly. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives underlying the exemptions and must comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Accordingly, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effects (see, inter alia, Case C‑174/11 Zimmermann [2012] ECR, paragraph 22 and case-law cited)." ​(MDDP C-319/12)
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- Consistent with fiscal neutrality
"[25] As is clear from settled case-law, the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 132 of the VAT Directive are to be interpreted strictly. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives underlying the exemptions and must comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Accordingly, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effects (see, inter alia, Case C‑174/11 Zimmermann [2012] ECR, paragraph 22 and case-law cited)." ​(MDDP C-319/12)
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- Conditions concerning status/identity of economic agent have independent EU meaning
"[18] It is settled case-law that the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law (see the judgment in Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 11). That must also be true of the specific conditions laid down for those exemptions to apply and in particular of those concerning the status or identity of the economic agent performing the services covered by the exemption." (Bulthuis-Griffioen C-453/93)
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NATIONAL LEGISLATION​
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CASE LAW​
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Order rather than judgment ​
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- Where answer may be clearly deduced from existing case-law
"[24] Pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the answer to a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling may be clearly deduced from existing case-law, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate General, at any time give its decision by reasoned order." (Purple Parking Ltd C-117/11)
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Nature of answer given by CJEU constrained by framing by national court​
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- CJEU refusing to take into account additional matters relied on by tax authority
"[28] However, the German Government refers to an additional factor relating to national law. It states that it is apparent from an administrative circular, applicable since 1 January 2009, that even private hospitals which are not approved under Paragraph 108 of the SGB V may qualify for exemption from VAT where their services correspond to those performed by hospitals managed by public bodies or by approved hospitals within the meaning of Paragraph 108 of the SGB V and the costs of those services are largely borne by health insurance funds or other social security bodies.
[29] In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, the Court is only empowered to rule on the interpretation or validity of EU law in the light of the factual and legal situation as described by the referring court, in order to provide that court with such guidance as will assist it in resolving the dispute before it (judgment of 17 December 2020, Onofrei, C‑218/19, EU:C:2020:1034, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
[30] Thus, it is for the Court to answer the national court’s questions as they have been framed and within the limits set by the national court." (I GmbH C-228/20)
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